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The paper analyzes how the WTO-rule system has to adjust to a globalized
world economy. Challenges in the traditional area of the exchange of goods
and rules for new areas of international exchange (services, property rights,
factors of production) are discussed. Specific attention is given to new rules for
the environment. A variety of approaches are dealt with that stabilize the rule
system and improve its acceptance.
J.E.L.-Klassifikation: F02Institutions matter. They define how things are being done. In the world econ-
omy, as in national economies, a set of norms, rules and informal procedures
serve to reduce transactions costs, most prominently to diminish uncertainty
arising from the behavior of market participants or originating from the non-
cooperative conduct of sovereign nation states. The basic idea of such a world
economic order for the trading system is to provide an institutional framework
that allows the participating economies to capture the potential welfare gains
from the international division of labor.
An international order
1 which develops in the course of time (Axelrod 1986,
North 1990) represents a public good being used in equal amounts by all. It
provides a skeleton of an international economic constitution for sovereign
nation states in the area of international exchange. A rule system for the be-
havior of governments take the place of ad hoc negotiations between govern-
ments. A central element of such a rule-based institutional framework for the
world economy is that sovereign states voluntarily commit themselves to re-
spect rules which prevent strategic, i.e. uncooperative, behavior by individual
countries. The contractually binding commitments, undertaken freely by govern-
ments, are ratified through domestic legislative processes (Ruggiero 1998).
Strategic behavior of national governments would destroy the public good of the
international order; representing a negative externality for the rule system. The
rules must prevent such strategic behavior. Self-commitment by states limits
national governments' choice of actions in the future and in this sense repre-
sents a negative catalogue. It protects the international division of labor against
national governments (Tumlir 1983: 72). The self-commitment of states is also
a shelter from the power of protectionist groups in the individual economies.
Moreover, the rules must induce nation states to act cooperatively in certain
* Paper presented at the Symposium on the World Trading System ..Fifty Years:
Looking Back, Looking Forward", Graduate Institute of International Studies and
World Trade Organization, Geneva, April 30, 1998. I appreciate critical comments
from Rolf J. Langhammer, Oliver Lorz and Daniel Piazolo.
1 On the relevance of establishing an institutional order (»OrdnungspolitiK') compare
the Freiburg school of economics in Germany, especially Eucken (1940).-2-
areas (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 513) and to develop the system further.
The WTO is not only about respecting rules but also about rule making.
The contents of the institutional arrangement for the world economy depend on
the types of interdependence among countries. The rules follow changes and
trends in global interdependence. When traditional areas in the international
division of labor vary in their character, rules have to adjust. When new areas of
international exchange are opened up, new rules have to be worked out. When
the rule system itself leads to liberalization, new rules have to be developed for
a more liberalized world (Krueger 1998: 3). Traditionally, rules for the exchange
of goods are at the core of the world trade order. Recently, other impediments
to trade such as national competition policies, national regulations and social
norms are discussed. Moreover, other areas of exchange have come to the
foreground such as the trade of services and the international exchange in in-
formation technology and information services. Also rules for the mobility of pro-
duction factors — labor, investment (capital) and technology, most prominently
property rights — as well as conditions for the international division of labor in
the financial and monetary area are receiving increased attention in the eco-
nomic policy discussion. Finally, norms for the use of the environment will
acquire greater significance in the future.
Our issue is how the policy of establishing, securing and extending a world
trading order is affected by a globalizing international economy. Globalization
means that the interdependencies among countries in the world economy are
becoming more intense. Transport costs and communication costs are drasti-
cally decreasing, other impediments to the international exchange such as
tariffs and political barriers lose importance, the economic distance shrinks: i) In
the goods market, segmentations are reduced, markets are more contestable,
competition becomes fiercer, ii) New regions like Eastern Europe and China, so
far more or less excluded from the international economy, are now being fully
integrated into the international division of labor. Since these countries have an
abundant labor supply, the world experiences an increase in the supply of-3-
labor. At the same time, the world market is widening to an unprecedented ex-
tent, iii) New products such as services are gaining more relevance in the inter-
national division of labor, iv) Capital and technical knowledge become more
mobile, locational competition among states for mobile capital and mobile
technical knowledge is intensified, v) There is a greater awareness of global
phenomena, an important area being global environmental goods.
I. Challenges in the Traditional Area of the Exchange of Goods
The aim of the trading system is to allow the international division of labor to
occur as smoothly as possible. For this task, quite a few challenges exist in the
traditional area of trade.
Finishing some missing pieces of the free trade system. One line of strengthen-
ing the WTO-system is to continue the liberalization efforts in the traditional
areas of merchandise trade and to finish some missing pieces of the institu-
tional arrangement for free trade (Langhammer 1998). This means to push the
results of the Uruguay Round further. First, there is room for further tariff reduc-
tions. Even though average tariffs rates of the OECD countries are low, peak
tariffs are still relatively high for some consumer goods. Average industrial tariff
rates of developing countries are in the range of 10 to 20 percent (Finger et al.
1996). Second, all voluntary export restraints which were used to circumvent
tariff liberalization should be eliminated by the year 2000. No new forms of
quantitative restrictions should be allowed. Third, the two sectoral exemptions
from the non-discrimination principle and from the most-favored-nation treat-
ment in the domains of agriculture and textiles represent quite a challenge. It is
important to stick to the phase-out until 2005 in textiles, and not to delay the
bulk of liberalization to the lastest possible deadline (Blackhurst 1997,
Spinanger 1997). In agriculture, where tariffs have become more important with
the tarification of quantitative restraints, new negotiations have to be launched.-4-
Subsidies and Strategic Trade Policy. When tariffs and quantitative restraints
will lose importance in the future, governments may be tempted to use sub-
sidies in order to lower their producers' production costs, thus establishing an
artificial price advantage and distorting the international division of labor. One
conceivable response to this would be simply to ignore and tolerate domestic
subsidies, especially for old industries like coal since a subsidizing country does
not employ its resources optimally, and thereby accepts a loss of its own wel-
fare. One cannot, however, be too complacent about domestic subsidies be-
cause strategic trade theory could, in the future, become more appealing to
practical politics and provide a rationale for subsidizing ,,new" sectors, albeit on
the basis of rather naive models. We may see more of this interventionistic ap-
proach in some European countries as a reaction to globalization with subsidies
by one country being used to take market shares away from the corresponding
sectors of other countries. This may lead to political demands for retaliation.
Thus, the effect of subsidies may be as detrimental to international trade as
traditional protectionist measures; they may also be part of an aggressive bilat-
eralism. According to the WTO-rules, trade-distorting subsidies for export goods
and import substitutes are forbidden and product- and industry-specific sub-
sidies are inadmissible if they harm the trade opportunities of other members.
Even so it is difficult to demarcate subsidy practices from other admissible poli-
cies such as research assistance and aid in adapting to new environmental
technologies. It is likewise difficult to penalize and stop violations in the frame-
work of monitoring processes. Furthermore, important sectors such as agri-
culture and the aviation industry either implicitly or explicitly still enjoy special
treatment. Therefore, the existing subsidy code, of which the core is present in
the world trade order, must be further developed in order to prevent subsidy
competition between governments.
2
National technology policy should be dealt with in the same way as national
subsidies. Thus, the international subsidy code must set limits for industry-
2 On the difficulty of subsidy control compare the EU-experience.-5-
specific research subsidies. In contrast, there is no need for international insti-
tutional regulations concerning the improvement of the general conditions for
research and development, for example, when countries generally improve the
tax framework or the conditions for research and development, innovation, in-
vestment and entrepreneurial activity as well as organize basic research and
further technology transfer so that their countries can be internationally com-
petitive.
Administered Protection. Antidumping and countervailing duty measures,
though elegantly defensible on a theoretical level, can easily develop into a
severe impediment for trade. They are defined by national legislation and can
be captured by national interest groups. They represent a way around bound
tariffs and (now) forbidden quantitative restraints. Even if they are not actually
applied, the threat of using them entails uncertainty and may already lead to the
..appropriate" export behavior. In economic categories, contingent protection
represents effective protection. This ..administered protection" (Krueger 1998: 8)
seems to have become more important as an instrument of US trade policy as
a protectionist device in the course of time. The task for the WTO will be to con-
tain the protectionist impact of this approach; standards have to be defined
which must be respected by national anti-dumping laws.
A New Form of Protectionism? With the integration of the world economy due
to globalization, single sectors, individual regions or specific groups may lose,
most prominently low-skilled labor in the industrialized countries. Although the
academic debate is still unresolved with respect to the question whether the
need for wage differentiation in industrial countries is due to labor saving tech-
nological progress or due to intensified trade (Freeman 1995, Baldwin 1998),
political pressure in industrialized countries may increase to take refuge in pro-
tectionist devices, especially in continental Europe where unemployment is
high. This is a severe threat to the world trading system. Moreover, some
developing countries fear to become marginalized in a globalized world. The in-
ternational community has to withstand these political pressures for more pro--6-
tectionism. The main response to this backlash of globalization must be to point
out that each individual country will gain from an intensified international divi-
sion of labor than under fragmented markets. It is the task of each country to
find national measures to compensate the potential losers of globalization.
Social Standards. As a response to globalization there have been increasingly
calls to harmonize social norms internationally or to introduce world wide mini-
mum standards (on environmental norms see below). Several arguments are
put forward. One is that it is ethically not acceptable to have workers in devel-
oping countries work under dramatically diverging conditions from those in the
developed world. The other is that workers in industrialized countries cannot
possibly compete against the low wages in the developing countries and that
"reasonable" social norms in industrial countries cannot be enforced if imports
enter markets under "sub-standard" norms. The harmonization of social norms
is supposed to be accomplished by using trade policy measures as a threat.
Countries which do not apply these standards would be denied access to
markets elsewhere. Above all, the developing countries would be negatively
affected by such an approach. These countries have a lower labor productivity
and are thus unable to pay the same wages that industrialized countries can
pay. For similar reasons neither can they be expected to adopt the industrial-
ized countries' social security systems. Therefore, a world-wide harmonization
of social standards should be avoided.
Free Market Access. The world trade order is essentially oriented to denying
governments (or integrated regions) tariff and non-tariff instruments with which
the governments could directly intervene in trade flows at their borders. Such
instruments have been outlawed through a negative catalogue. However, this
does not guarantee that there will be free access to markets. Quite in contrast,
recently national legislation has become more important as a market entry
barrier. Such barriers, arising from national legislation or practices, can include
economic policy measures in the broadest sense, such as licensing procedures
for economic activities including facilities and products, technical standards,-7-
arrangements for the public contract system and interlocking ties between firms
(as with Keiretsu in Japan) on the same or different levels of the vertical pro-
duction structure, thereby discriminating against outsiders (Ostry 1995).
Recently the tendency has become apparent to link market access more
strongly to national regulations of the country-of-destination. Such conditions
set up additional barriers to the international division of labor. The country-of-
destination principle leaves it to the importing country to set the domestic stan-
dard as the yardstick for its imports. The result would be a potpourri of diverging
standards representing barriers to trade; moreover, such regulations can easily
be captured by interest groups. The attempt of GATT has been — and the aim
of the WTO must be — to push back the role of the country-of-destination prin-
ciple. Which regulations are set for the production of goods should be left to the
discretion of the country-of-origin. The different regulations of national coun-
tries-of-origin should rather have equal standing competing with each other. A
weakening of the country-of-origin principle and a strengthening of the country-
of-destination principle will inevitably harm the multilateral order (Langhammer
1998). The goal of the world trade order is therefore that countries mutually ac-
cept the regulations of the country-of-origin for product quality and production
processes in order to minimize transaction costs. Thus, competition among
rules can thrive. Only in precisely demarcated cases, for example, public health
protection, should the country-of-destination and its standards take precedence
over the norms of the country-of-origin. But even then the measures adopted
should involve neither discrimination nor protection.
Competition Policy. In an international economic order, markets must not be
closed or distorted through the market power of firms. The globalization of world
markets does make markets more competitive, and in this sense free trade is
the best competition policy; all measures which increase market access support
competition policy. However, globalization also enables enterprises to orient
their policies with the aim to create international monopolistic positions and to
exploit them in controlling prices to the disadvantage of buyers. Two issues-8-
arise in this respect: One is that national competition policies should not be
oriented towards the advantage of domestic enterprises or home-based multi-
nationals and should not permit firms to build up or exploit monopolistic posi-
tions internationally. The other is that (national or international) competition
policy should counteract business practices intended to reduce competition,
prevent the exploitation of market power, and help to improve the contestability
of the world product markets.
An international institutional framework in which competition policy effectively
restricts the misuse of monopolistic market positions and discourages competi-
tion-limiting mergers is not presently foreseeable. Currently, the international
community does not appear close to an agreement on a right of complaint
which parties injured by anti-competitive practices or policies could employ be-
fore an international court or an international competition authority empowered
to enforce competition rules (Scherer 1994). Thus, at present we can only ex-
pect to establish a few minimal competition policy rules for countries or inte-
grated regions (such as the European Union), either in the framework of the
WTO (Immenga 1995) or the OECD. We must also consider the option that ini-
tially only some of the rules would be agreed upon by the most important OECD
countries, because there are fundamental differences in their legal systems, as
between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European law. What will be necessary is
to change the orientation of national competition policies. Restrictions on com-
petition which domestic enterprises impose abroad will have to be taken into
account so that a country harmed by another country's competition policy will
have the right to obtain changes in the objectionable competition policy. An in-
stitutional consultation- and sanctioning mechanism must be created (Graham
1995). The details of how a framework for competition policy can be achieved is
currently being intensively discussed in the literature (WTO 1997). Under con-
sideration are the effects doctrine with an international right to extra-territorial
legal application (Immenga 1995), treaty agreements — including bilateral trea-
ties between the USA and Europe — on the concession of mutual competen-
cies (Ehlermann 1995), the harmonization of international competition law on-9-
the basis of national legal system (Fikentscher and Immenga 1995) and the
competition of institutional rules through mutual recognition, thus a Cassis-de-
Dijon approach with an international interpretation (Nicolaides 1994).
Multilateral Trading System and Bilateralism. The multilateral trading system is
not effectively protected against aggressive bilateral trade policy. The United
States and the European Union have set up new arsenals of trade policy in-
struments. These can be employed as retaliatory measures or market openers
without regard for the mechanisms of the world trade order. Thus, with its in-
strument "Super 301" the USA can react within the shortest period against trade
policy measures of other countries. It can independently introduce trade-limiting
measures against individual states. Agreed-on preferential trade treatment can
be canceled, import restrictions imposed and bilateral export limitation agree-
ments arranged. With the so-called "Trade Defence Instruments" the European
Union has created a similar apparatus. With these trade policy weapons, in the
sense of result-oriented bilaterally conceived systems (Dornbusch 1990), the
two trading blocs have introduced the option to exempt themselves from the
rules of the multilateral world trade order (Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994: 119). The
danger exists that bilateral measures will escalate and that the multilateral order
will thereby degenerate. The additional risk is that a large player like the United
States receives preferential treatment by exerting a country-specific market ac-
cess. Moreover, export interests can reach their targets outside the WTO; they
no longer are a counterweight to the protectionist forces (Krueger 1998: 9). This
weakens the WTO. An aggressive market opening policy must be integrated
into the rules of the world trade order. It is desirable to limit bilateralism.
Multilateral Trading System versus Regionalism. The territorial exception from
the principle of most-favored-nation treatment which holds for regional integra-
tion schemes (free trade areas, custom unions) conjures up the fundamental
danger that the multilateral order will disintegrate into regional blocs (Bhagwati
1992). It is true that past experience suggests that regional integration has not
led to significant segmentation (WTO 1995). The regional integration efforts in-10-
Latin America have so far tended to remain weak; the new regional integration
in East Asia (APEC) is geared to market integration and is not set to create
external barriers. European integration has had attractive power — it has not
closed itself to the possibility of accepting additional members. Through the
growth of regional integration, cum grano salis, the trade diversion effects at the
expense of third parties were, despite protectionistic interventions, probably
overcompensated, except for agriculture. The North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) lacks the internal coherence found in the European Union. In spite of
all this, the danger cannot be dismissed that regional blocs could become
entangled in an escalating trade war. Thus, in the case of a conflict between
the blocs, NAFTA could, even without a de jure common trade policy, tend to
reinforce a possible aggressive trade policy on the part of the United States.
Moreover, an extended regionalism in Europe, the Americas and Asia, could
divert interest away from the WTO and weaken the multilateral trade system. It
is therefore important to find mechanisms which multilateralize regional integra-
tions.
II. Rules for New Areas of International Exchange
Besides the trade of traditional goods, new forms of international interdepend-
ence have come to the foreground in the international division of labor, among
them services and the exchange of factors of production, i.e. of technical
knowledge, capital and labor. The movement of factors of production plays an
important role in a new paradigm, namely in the context of locational competi-
tion among governments.
Services. Manufacturing accounts for 33 percent of the world GDP; in the
industrialized countries the share of manufacturing in GDP is much lower, 25
percent in European countries and below 20 in the United States (Siebert
1997). Services make up 63 percent of world GDP; exports of services add up-11 -
to 18-20 percent (1993-95) of total world exports (merchandise plus service
trade) and have grown at a higher rate than traditional trade in the seventies.
The international division of labor in the area of services relates to diverse
phenomena: a service like an international telephone call may actually cross
the border ("cross-border supply"), consumers or firms of one country may use
the service in another country ("consumption abroad"), a service may be sup-
plied in another country ("commercial presence") or individuals may travel to
supply their service in another country ("presence of natural persons"). The
diversity of services becomes apparent by the GATT classification list with 7
main categories (and 62 subcategories), namely distribution services, education
services, communication services (including telecommunication services,
autovisual services such as motion picture production and distribution, radio
and television services), health care services, professional services (including
legal services, accounting services, advertising services, architecture, engineer-
ing), transportation services and travel and tourism services. In addition other
areas and aspects have to be taken into consideration, as in the annexes like
the movement of natural persons (temporary stay) and financial services.
A rule system for the international exchange of services should hold for the
whole variety of services. Since the phenomena to which rules are to be applied
are so divergent, it is difficult to establish an all-encompassing international rule
system. A major distinction is between border-crossing and local services
analogous to tradeable and non-tradeable goods. For this classification, an-
other distinction becomes relevant, namely between "person-disembodied" and
"person-embodied" services (Bhagwati 1984; Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994: 128).
Disembodied services are not "embodied" in persons, for example, detail en-
gineering using computer supported programs, the development of software
and the adoption of accounting systems. For the international trading order,
these services (cross-border supply) are not very different from material goods.
Just as commodities are carried by the transport system, disembodied services
cross national borders by means of communication media. As a consequence,-12-
markets must be open for them just as they must be for commodities. Border-
crossing disembodied services should be treated like commodities.
In the case of person-embodied services (consumption abroad, commercial
presence, presence of national persons), non-discrimination can be obtained
through national treatment, i.e. equal treatment for foreigners and one's own
nationals. With person-embodied services two cases are to be systematically
distinguished. First, foreign enterprises may have a competitive advantage rela-
tive to domestic enterprises as a result of their organization, technical
knowledge or other factors, without lower labor costs being the decisive factor.
For example, a foreign insurance company may have a more favorable risk
structure. Second, with person-embodied services the competitive advantages
may be based on the low costs for labor alone, in which case national treatment
of foreign suppliers is especially controversial. But even in this case it accords
with the basic concept of the international division of labor that market access
must be free. It must be permitted to suppliers from other countries to offer their
services at the prices prevailing in the country-of-origin. In both cases, national
treatment opens up market access.
The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) established for the first
time a framework for notification of existing rules, but it has a long way to go
before a rule system for all forms of international services with free market ac-
cess is fully developed (Snape 1998). Markets are yet to be opened in many
respects, barriers discriminating against foreigners or non-discriminatory bar-
riers erected by competition policy will have to be torn down, the product cover-
age must be extended. So far, these are exemptions to the most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment (favor one, favor all); the conditionality of the most favored na-
tion clause prevalent in services must be extended to an unconditional use. Na-
tional treatment as a central principle only applies to services where a country
has made a specific committment, exemptions are allowed. Moreover, the pre--13-
sent approach is to find agreements for specific services.
3 This sector-by-sector
approach raises the risk that sector specific aspects dominate; it has the dis-
advantage that it does not sufficiently harness the export interests of the econ-
omy as a whole in order to dismantle barriers of trade (Krueger 1998: 405).
flutes for the internationally mobile factors. Besides the exchange of goods and
services, factor migrations are a further important form of interdependence
between economies. Countries compete for mobile technical knowledge and
mobile capital. Factor migrations are interlinked with the exchange of goods in
various ways. In the case of technology and non-financial capital, factor migra-
tions can occur through trade in goods or they even themselves represent trade
in goods, as with the purchase or sale of user rights, for example, patents. They
may, in a comparative-static sense, take the place of movements of goods and
thus serve as a substitute to commodity flows, but in a dynamic perspective
they can, in the sense of acquired comparative advantage, also decisively in-
fluence future comparative advantages and thereby be forerunners for the trade
of goods in the future (Siebert 1998b).
In contrast to the somewhat esoteric strategic trade literature, locational com-
petition {Standortwettbewerb) may be a more relevant concept explaining the
behavior of governments in the global economy. According to this approach,
governments compete for the mobile factors of production, namely mobile
technical knowledge and mobile capital. The policy instruments the govern-
ments can use in order to attract these mobile factors are institutional arrange-
ments, taxes and infrastructure in the widest sense, including the educational
and the university systems. If a country succeeds in attracting mobile produc-
tion factors or in keeping them from leaving the country, the real income for the
immobile production factors increases, especially for labor.
3 In financial services a multilateral agreement has been reached in December 1997
with 70 WTO members, other sector agreements relate to telecommunication and
the information technology.
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Some fear that competition among states will represent a downward spiral in
the provision of public goods and that this race to the bottom will degenerate;
this fear is unfounded (Siebert 1996a). Even with high taxation rates, non-
financial capital will not emigrate if infrastructure capital is adequate and if the
immobile labor supply possesses suitable qualifications, i.e. if human capital is
well developed. Capital taxation can thus be compensated for (within limits)
through the quality of public production factors, especially if these are financed
in the sense of the principle of equivalence (or benefit taxation) from taxes or
user prices. Rising marginal costs of production with lower human capital and
poorer physical infrastructure ensure that locational competition for mobile
capital finds a self-imposed lower limit. The better its provision of human- and
infrastructure capital, the less a country needs to fear locational competition.
Consequently, an appropriate reaction is to let locational competition among
governments play. Nevertheless, locational competition may be a new area of
interest for the economic world order. Some aspects are discussed in the
following.
Property Rights. When countries compete for mobile technical knowledge,
property rights become important. These relate to all sorts of intellectual
property, copyright and associated rights, trademarks, industrial design,
patents, the layout-designs of integrated circuits and geographical indications
(like appellations of origin). Issues to be solved (and already included in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs))
are minimum standards of protection to be provided by the individual countries,
enforcement of intellectual property rights and dispute settlements.
With respect to patents an institutional arrangement must be found which, by
respecting property rights, offers sufficient incentives for individual economies
to search for new knowledge, but simultaneously does not in the long term bloc
possible diffusion of new knowledge throughout the world. Thus, a similar
problem must be solved to that of a national patent system. On the one hand,
user rights to new technical knowledge must be secure, since otherwise there-15-
will be insufficient incentives to search for and adopt new technical knowledge.
This means that property rights to new knowledge must be respected through-
out the world. On the other hand, this property protection must not create per-
manently exclusive positions and make markets uncompetitive. Rather, the dif-
fusion of new knowledge must be possible after a certain passage of time; ac-
cordingly time limits should be set on the protective effect of user rights. The
optimal duration of protective rights depends among other things on product life
cycles and the time frame of research and development phases; this can differ
greatly from product to product. Since countries may have an interest in protect-
ing their firms' technological knowledge for as long as possible (although this
reduces the incentives for their own technological dynamics), the solution can-
not consist simply in mutually recognizing national patent laws. Rather, it may
be desirable to set time limits on the validity of national patents. With respect to
the other types of property rights such as trademarks and geographical indica-
tions there is no necessity to let protection run out.
Rules for capital. International capital mobility limits national governments' free-
dom of action and changes the opportunity costs of economic-policy decisions.
This holds not only for the case when capital should be attracted, but also when
its emigration should be prevented. For each economic-policy consideration, for
instance about the tax system, about infrastructure and about regulations, the
cost-benefit calculus is affected by a higher capital mobility; the opportunity
costs of economic decisions are raised if capital can choose between various
locations.
One position for the rules on capital mobility is to assume that it is in the best
interest of each country to keep capital at home and attract more capital from
outside. Each country should structure its institutional framework accordingly,
thus provide for the security of property rights, avoid uncertainty about corpo-
rate taxes, develop a tax system and a general economic framework and sup-
ply an efficient infrastructure which all make the country attractive as a location.
An important condition for an efficient international division of labor is therefore- 16-
that capital should not be prevented from seeking better opportunities abroad.
Otherwise countries would force their savers to invest solely at home. The allo-
cation of savings would then be inefficient. An explicit exit right for savings is
thereby a decisive element of the international division of labor. But an exit right
is not a sufficient incentive if we consider physical capital which is locked in. Of
course one can argue that we can leave capital mobility to the locational com-
petition of governments. But even if in the end it is the host country's responsi-
bility to enhance its own attractiveness, multilateral agreements can make the
direct investments of the sending country more secure for its companies, and
multilateral agreements may make potential recipient countries appear less
risky for direct investments.
4 Moreover, uncertainty for investment may be a
cause for uncertainty in trade. Consequently, an investment code is required
which surpasses the trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). It is an open
question whether a two speed approach should be recommended for an in-
vestment code with the OECD countries going ahead and the WTO following or
whether an investment code has better chances to be accepted if it is iniated by
the WTO (Krueger 1998: 408). Eventually, an investment code should be ad-
ministered by the WTO.
5
flutes for immigration. In all countries citizens should be guaranteed an exit
option as a civil liberty. The right of individuals to leave a country, i.e. the exit
option, can be interpreted as an important element of a liberal order. The indi-
vidual should have the opportunity to choose to leave given life conditions
which he or she finds unacceptable. A credible right to exit which is respected
by the government of the potential country-of-emigration is as a rule a limit on
the actions of that government and should represent an implicit control of
governmental actions reduce the incentive for individuals to emigrate.
6
4 The argument is analogous to subsidies to old industries which hurt the subsidizing
country but can not be ignored in the world trading order.
5 On WTO-Plus, see below.
6 The openness of goods markets and the mobility of capital reduce the necessity of
migration.-17-
The exit option does not, however, imply the right to immigrate into any given
country. States define their identity by setting their immigration policy (Hillman
1994). This creates difficult ethical questions which can be more easily resolved
if potential countries of immigration — beyond the duty to accept the politically
persecuted — are sufficiently open and if regional integrations such as the
European Union, although only spatially limited from an international economic
perspective, guarantee freedom of movement within their territory. For many
reasons labor migration should be replaced by the movement of goods and
capital mobility. If a country finds open markets for its goods elsewhere and
attracts capital, its citizens do not need to emigrate. The strengthening of an
international economic order for the international exchange of goods and the
openness of markets reduces the necessity of migration.
Stability in other areas, especially in the financial markets. A rule system for the
exchange of goods and services and the free movement of factors of produc-
tion requires stability in other areas of international interdependence. The rule
system of a trading order is not sustainable if other important areas of interna-
tional interdependence are unstable. Obviously, political stability is a necessary
condition for the WTO system (which contributes itself to international political
stability). Another condition is the absence of excessive exchange rate volatility
and of instability in the financial markets. This can be discussed under the
heading of interdependence of orders in the sense of Eucken (1940); it also has
been addressed in a more technical sense as the issue of "coherence" among
international organizations.
Exchange rate volatility leads time and again to demands for greater stability in
the international currency system. It can not be denied that nominal exchange
rates are greatly influenced by financial flows and that they can overshoot and
thus distort trade flows. No doubt, there can be speculative bubbles. However,
the following points have to be taken into consideration:-18-
First, currency convertibility is a very important ingredient of the world trading
systems. Restricting the convertibility of currency for foreigners or citizens,
setting different exchange rates for different transaction purposes, for example,
for goods considered more or less important or for movements of goods and
capital, granting privileged access to better exchange rates as in a system of
import licenses, and exchange rate protectionism all have negative conse-
quences for the exchange of goods and the efficient allocation of capital. It is
hard to profit from the international division of labor if currency convertibility is
limited by different countries' political decisions. Especially after the experience
of the thirties, countries made efforts during the period of reconstruction follow-
ing the Second World War to ensure convertibility and liberalize capital move-
ments. Therefore, as a rule the need for currency convertibility is accepted
today.
Second, the problem of excessive volatility in exchange rates can be solved by
small countries with an exchange rate oriented monetary policy (the Nether-
lands, Austria) or a currency board (Argentina, Estonia). These countries attach
themselves to a country with a stable price level. This has often been success-
ful in the short-term, but in the mid-term it entails great pressure toward mone-
tary, fiscal and wage policy adaptation to the situation in the anchor country.
For large countries this solution is as a rule politically unacceptable. In addition,
at least one larger country must be the stability leader. A solution for larger
countries would be to submit to a system which guarantees stability. Historically
the gold standard has been such a system. Countries refrained from employing
a national stabilization policy. They accepted fluctuations in output and em-
ployment in order to maintain exchange rate stability. Such an approach is not
internationally practical today: For one thing, no anchor is visible on the horizon;
gold can hardly serve as such an anchor. For another, a readiness to submit to
an international rule system is lacking.
Third, other approaches for limiting the volatility of exchange rates must be re-
garded skeptically: i) It will not prove possible to set up reference zones for ex--19-
change rates (Williamson 1983), if the conditions for stability are not fulfilled in
the individual countries, ii) The idea of a return to a system analogous to that of
Bretton Woods ignores the fact that financial markets are now globalized, iii)
Throwing sand into the gears of international financial markets (Tobin-tax;
Tobin 1978) works against the aim of reducing transaction costs.
Fourth, too often — if not always — the triggers for exchange rate volatility are
political ones reflecting economic policy conditions, above all failed stabilization
policy, fiscal disorder, misguided monetary policy and also real economic
changes. Exchange rate movements thus represent a barometer of fundamen-
tal disturbances.
Under these conditions a solution can only consist in each individual country
keeping its own house in order and maintaining a stable domestic price level.
Then exchange rates will generally remain stable. This approach should be
complemented by some minimum agreement on prudential rules for the finan-
cial sector in order to shield the overall system against instability.
III. Rules for the Use of the Environment
Globalization also means that awareness of global interdependence increases.
This is especially relevant in the use of nature and the environment. Countries
are not only interdependent in terms of goods, production factors and monetary
transactions; they also influence each other through the use of nature and the
environment as receptacle for wastes and emissions. However, a distinction
should be made between whether national usage rights are definable for nature
and the environment or whether global or border-crossing environmental goods
are at stake (Siebert 1998a).
The environment as a factor of national endowment. Similar as countries are
differently endowed with capital and labor, there are also territorial differences-20-
in the capacity of nature for absorbing emissions. The absorptive and regen-
erative capacities of regional environments vary. In addition, heavy population
density makes it more difficult to spatially separate residential and recreational
areas from environmentally-degrading transport and production activities. The
preferences of countries for environmental quality can differ as well. If the en-
vironment is an immobile resource factor, the prices for environmental services
— as a receptacle of emissions — must also differ between countries. Different
environmental scarcities will thus be signaled by different prices. A market
economy approach to environmental policy which taxes emissions or estab-
lishes prices for environmental services through emission trading is consistent
with an institutional framework for the international division of labor. Insofar as
the environment is a national endowment factor, prices can express the differ-
ent environmental scarcities of countries. The environment is then fundamen-
tally not the object of an international rule system.
Protecting health and conserving natural resources. If prices for environmental
use are not (or cannot be) applied and other measures such as administrative
approaches, emission norms or product standards are employed by countries
to protect their citizens' health and life and to conserve natural resources
(Article XX of the GATT Treaty), those measures must be non-discriminatory.
Non-discrimination requires that in the case of market entry restrictions, regula-
tions through production permits, facility permits and product norms must not
give preference to domestic producers and domestic goods. Thus, it should not
be permissible, for example, with the aim of reducing health hazards, as in the
Thailand cigarette case (1990), to restrict the import of goods or to tax them
unless the same measures are simultaneously taken against similar domestic
goods. The similarity of the goods plays a crucial role in non-discrimination.
Similarity of products should be defined from the demand side, for example, in
terms of possible harmful effects, and not from the production side, i.e. from the
production technology. As in the Mexican-American tuna fish case (1991), the
principle of similarity should not be applied to the production methods (in the
tuna fish case methods of fishing which do not sufficiently protect dolphins).-21 -
This means that the country-of-origin principle should apply. Non-discrimination
should also satisfy the condition that measures taken are in accordance with
the proportionality principle. Measures must accordingly be necessary in the
sense that otherwise environmental policy aims or the protection of natural re-
sources can not be achieved. As a rule, these aims are, however, better
achieved through specific environmental policy measures rather than through
trade policy. Thus, if environmental policy employs a regulatory approach to
national environments, the non-discrimination and country-of-origin principles
should apply.
The territorial principle as a restraint for national measures. Since countries
have different amounts of environmental resources and also different environ-
mental preferences, those with stronger environmental preferences should not
be entitled to impose their environmental preferences on other countries by
means of trade-restricting measures (Siebert 1996b). The thesis that the
country-of-origin principle should be fundamentally recognized for national en-
vironments is generalizable. If harmful effects appear outside a country's terri-
torial area, countries should not have the right to use trade policy to influence
the production methods of a country-of-origin. Also, the protective clauses for
health, life and exhaustible resources of Article XX should in the case of
national environmental goods be applied only within a country's own territorial
area. Countries should thus not have the right to employ unilateral measures to
protect the environment in other countries. Thus, trade policy must not be em-
ployed to force national preferences on other countries. Any country's environ-
mental policy should not apply to external effects outside its own territorial area.
The environment as a global public good. In contrast to national environmental
goods, global environmental goods are public goods with a world wide spatial
dimension. In what amount and with what quality these public goods should be
produced requires an agreement of all countries. What must be decided on is
not just the extent to which emissions should be reduced, but rather also the
proper distribution of costs among individual countries. It is difficult to reach-22-
international consensus, because countries have different preferences and be-
cause they have different per capita incomes and thus a different willingness to
pay. In addition, the cost functions for disposal differ from country to country.
Moreover, nations can behave as a free-rider. Thus, implementing the polluter-
pays-principle for global goods runs into difficulties. To what extent a stable
international environmental framework with voluntary commitments by states
can be created under these conditions using compensatory payments is a
complex issue and has been the subject of numerous studies.
The consistency of the international trade order and the international environ-
mental order. Environmental policy aims at protecting the natural conditions for
life; i.e., it deals with scarcity. An institutional order for the international division
of labor attempts to make it possible to increase the prosperity of all countries
through exchange, i.e., it also deals with scarcity. Both orders attempt to do
away with distortions. Since environmental policy and international trade inter-
sect at many points, the rules of both frameworks should not conflict. The aims
are not in principle contradictory, since scarcity must be defined by taking the
natural conditions for life into account. If we start from the premise that the
valuation of the goods on which affluence is based as well as the valuation of
environmental quality must depend on the formation of the national will, a con-
tradiction between both regimes can be avoided.
In the past international arrangements for environmental questions and the
world trade order were developed separately and independently. In the future it
will be important to pay more attention to the consistency of both orders. The
more successfully the environment as a scarce good is integrated into the eco-
nomic orders of individual countries and the more affluence is defined by taking
into account nature and the environment, the sooner congruence of targets will
be achieved between both orders. Compared to the administrative approach
using regulations, the market economy approach to environmental policy pro-
vides more congruence between both sets of rules. The sooner the polluter-
pays principle is accepted as a guideline by all countries, the easier it will be to-23-
achieve consistency of the two orders in the case of global environmental con-
cerns. This clearly holds for national environmental goods. For global goods,
implementing the polluter-pays-principle has to overcome the difficulties men-
tioned above like the differences in preferences, in willingness-to-pay and free-
rider behavior. What would be needed is a consensus on the conditions under
which the polluter-pays-principle can be applied to global goods; this is equiva-
lent to a consensus under which conditions compensations must be used.
7 In-
consistencies between the WTO-system and environmental agreements should
be prevented (Siebert 1996b). The world trading order and groups of countries
signing international environmental agreements should not be too divergent.
Consistency on the operational level. Even if the international environmental
order and the international trade order must have consistent aims, the rules of
both orders must, however, not be contingent upon each other (see below). The
set of instruments of both orders must be kept separate. The following orienta-
tional points could minimize aim conflicts:
— The rules in the world environmental order and the world trade order should
not be mutually conditional. This would cause considerable uncertainty not
only in the international division of labor, but also in the production of en-
vironmental goods. Institutional orders should not be uncertain.
— Judging from past experience it appears ill-advised to create a temporary
waiver for environmental issues as an exception to the world trade order.
One reason is that the previously created exemptions for the agricultural and
textile sectors have become resistant to change and have led to a perma-
nent infringement of the most-favored-nation principle. If an exceptional
regulation is questionable even in the case of internationally declining sec-
7 We could also consider a minimal solution which would define improvements in en-
vironmental quality (or reduction of emissions) relative to the current state. Since,
however, the costs of improving a given state of the environment differ from country
to country, acceptance is doubtful. Cf. the discussion on the victim-pays principle for
cases of border-crossing environmental problems (Siebert 1998a).-24-
tors, then a similar procedure appears still less desirable for an area that will
be increasingly important in the future.
• Trade policy instruments should not be employed for environmental policy
purposes. Countries should not have the right to apply their environmental
policy outside their own territory. Non-discrimination and the priority of the
country-of-origin principle over the country-of-destination principle should be
guiding principles.
• The mediation of disputes by the World Trade Organization should be ex-
tended to include the environmental domain.
• In the case of global environmental goods a consensus should be devel-
oped under which conditions the polluter-pays principle and when compen-
sations should be applied.
IV. Approaches to Strengthen the World Order
The world trading order is permanently in a battle between forces that will
weaken it by striving for a larger role of strategic behavior of nation states and
between forces that attempt to contain and to push back the non-cooperative
behavior of national governments. As an international agreement among
sovereign nation states, the world trading order requires mechanisms that sta-
bilize the rule system. We distinguish i) negative incentives, i.e. sanctions, that
enforce rule behavior, ii) adjusting existing rules and creating new rules to fill in
the void, and iii) positive incentives that improve the acceptance of rules and
suggest to join the rule system.
Sanctions. An important mechanism in international contracts are sanctions
which can be taken if rules are violated. The WTO-dispute settlement proce-
dure is such a mechanism. Relative to GATT, the dispute settlement procedure
has been strengthened. Whereas the ruling of a panel set up to decide the dis-
pute can be appealed before the Appellate Body, the decision of the Appellate
Body is binding unless all parties are against its adoption. When the Dispute-25-
Settlement Body (DSB) has adopted the panel or the appellate report, the
losing party must either propose a suitable implementation of the report's
recommendations or negotiate compensation payment with the complaining
party. If there is no agreement on compensation or if the losing party does not
implement the proposed changes, the DSB can authorize the other party to im-
pose retaliary measures such as counter tariffs. The retaliation can occur in the
same sector, in other sectors or even in other agreements.
The litmus test of the settlement procedure is whether global players will accept
the verdicts of the Dispute Panels and of the Appellate Body. The preliminary
experience so far is a tentative yes. For instance, the EU has accepted the
WTO dispute settlement panel decision from September 1997 concerning the
EU import system for bananas and will change the import rules in accordance
with the WTO trade agreement.
8 The US has lost four cases in the WTO
panels and has each time accepted the outcome.
9 The two major trading blocs
have used the WTO settlement procedure frequently. The EU has brought
cases to the WTO panels 21 times and the US even 35 times; this can be taken
as an indicator of acceptance.
Still an open question is to what extent major players like the US will use their
own national sanctions such as the US ,,Super 301" from the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Act outside the WTO rule system or whether aggressive bilateralism can
be controlled under the WTO roof. With an effective dispute settlement proce-
dure firmly in place, there is no longer a need for clauses like the US ,,Super
8 In another case, the US-EU dispute over growth hormones in cattle, on 13 February
1998, the DSB has accepted the Appellate Body Report stating that the EU ban on
imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with hormones for growth
promotion is inconsistent with WTO agreements unless qualified scientific studies
are forwarded pointing to the health risks of such meat products.
9 Three minor cases concern silk shirts, underwear and imported gasoline, and a
major case involves Fuji and Eastman Kodak in 1997. Kodak tried to prove that
Japanese bureaucrats had given Fuji an advantage over Kodak in the Japanese
market, impeding Kodak to get access to Japanese retail outlets. But the WTO
panel rejected the complaint, arguing that the Japanese government had not pre-
vented Kodak from competing fairly in Japan.-26-
301". Bilateral negotiations outside the WTO framework and under threat of
national sanctions defy the foundations of the multilateral trading regimes.
Therefore, developments like the application of the ,,Super 301" or like the
Helms-Burton-Act should be closely monitored and clearly denounced.
Positive mechanisms. Besides sanctions, the world trading order has to contain
mechanisms that attempt to strengthen the institutional arrangement and to ex-
pand it. One such mechanism is the most favored nation clause which extends
reductions of trade barriers to third parties and thus multilaterizes liberaliza-
tions. Another mechanism is reciprocity of concessions requiring that the tariff
reduction of one country must be answered by other countries (even though the
concepts of reciprocity has its roots in a mercantilistic philosophy). Yet another
mechanism is to bind tariffs so that the results of liberalization rounds are
chiseled in stone and countries cannot easily walk away from reached agree-
ments.
1




Filling in the void. The rules must follow the problems and the rule-evading be-
havior of participants. When new areas develop in the international division of
labor an institutional vacuum exists where no rules apply. This void has to be
filled, for instance, in the area of the trade of services. Participants may also
find ways around the rules, i.e. they may substitute one way of protection by
another. An example are quantitative restraints (including voluntary export re-
straints) as a way around bound tariffs. In the future, national legislation may
1
0 A country that wants to raise the bound tariff has to negotiate with the countries
most concerned; it may have to compensate for the trading partners' loss of trade.
1
1 Tumlir (1979) has proposed to give individuals the right to go to the domestic courts
if rules of the world trading order are violated. Domestic courts would thus enforce
the rules of the international system. I am, in principle, sympathetic to this proposal.
However, it requires a clear-cut rule system for the international division of labor
which does not exist. Practical experience with courts and labor laws in some Euro-
pean countries suggests that courts have limited efficiency. Moreover, in a time
when the rule system for trade has to somehow incorporate environmental issues,
the rule system is extremely unclear. The same holds for class action suits in
domestic courts.-21 -
play a more important role, as in product standards, licensing of activities, ad-
ministered protection, competition policy, social standards and environmental
norms. Care must be taken that the protectionistic content of domestic legisla-
tion is contained.
The prospect of an increase in future benefits. An essential condition for the
creation and the stability of an international economic order is that the institu-
tional framework must be acceptable to all countries. Therefore, the transition
from non-cooperative to cooperative behavior must have an advantage for each
country. For this, an important prerequisite is that benefits are expected in the
future.
From an intertemporal perspective, the global rule system is a relational con-
tract (MacNeil 1978) in which countries interact along a time axis and in which a
strategic gain from non-cooperative behavior today must be confronted with the
opportunity costs of retaliation in future periods. Honoring a rule system or vio-
lating it must be interpreted as a repeated game in which an agent accumulates
or destroys reputation and in which the preparedness of the other agents to
cooperate tomorrow is affected by the agent's behavior today. These intertem-
poral linkages help to prevent reneging the contract and give stability to the
system.
For the stability of institutional arrangements it is therefore crucial that the indi-
vidual country's cost-benefit calculations should not shift asymmetrically over
time into the negative; quite to the contrary, the net advantage for each country
should increase over time. If this condition is not fulfilled, there will be an incen-
tive not to honor the treaty, but instead to withdraw from it. It must pay to stick
to the rules because there will be a reward in the future. As a practical conse-
quence, when the rule system is expanded, the advantages of membership
must be greater for each country than the advantages of non-membership.-28-
Packaging advantages and the single undertaking nature of the WTO. An insti-
tutional order consists of several suborders. Inevitably, the suborders are inter-
dependent, in Eucken's sense (1940). A specific suborder may benefit one
country more than another, while another suborder may be more advantageous
for another country. A greater advantage from a suborder can compensate for
the lesser advantage of another suborder. This aspect is significant for the ac-
ceptance of new suborders. Packaging advantages into one bundle is a promis-
ing approach in order to find acceptance for an international institutional frame-
work in cases in which an agreement on suborders cannot be reached.
The single undertaking nature of the WTO reflects the concept of packaging
the benefits arising in different areas of the international division of labor. In the
past, plurilateral agreements, introduced in the Tokyo Round, allowed a subset
of GATT-members to sign contracts for specific areas.
1
2 Such a procedure,
though easing a contract among at least some GATT-members, represents an
a-la-carte approach and entails the risk of fragmentation of the multilateral
trading system.
1
3 In principle, it can be expected that the single undertaking
nature of WTO will strengthen the rule system because it forces countries to
swallow less favorable rules in one area if they are compensated by rules allow-
ing higher benefits in other areas. The approach of packaging is also helpful in
focusing bargaining when a liberalization round is being concluded.
Preventing institutional domino effects. Packaging benefits stabilizes inter-
dependent suborders. However, this all-or-nothing approach may have its
drawbacks and some exceptions may indeed be helpful if they are associated




2 Agreement on Civil Aircraft, Agreement on Government Procurement, International
Dairy Agreement and International Bovine Agreement (the two last terminated at the
end of 1997).
1
3 Langhammer (1994: 11) shows that the ci la carte approach led to a large variance
in country coverage of individual agreements under the Tokyo Round umbrella.
1
4 An analogous question relates to regional integration processes. For instance in
European integration, integration at different speeds has been proposed to propel
the integration process.-29-
between the advantages of suborders should not be carried too far. If in the
course of time the advantages of countries shift asymmetrically in the individual
suborders, a fragile structure of acceptance could collapse like a house of
cards. To avoid domino effects, it makes sense that the suborders should basi-
cally legitimate themselves on their own and not be conditionally accepted.
The interdependence of suborders raises other issues. One is that the sub-
orders may contradict each other. Apparently, they must be mutually consistent.
One suborder must not lead to behavior on the part of economic agents which
contradicts and undermines some other suborder. As a consequence, sub-
orders must have the same or similar objectives or philosophies. An important
example of this consistency issue is the relation between the world trade order
and the world environmental order (see above). In any case, the interdepend-
ence of suborders must be taken into consideration when an overall rule
system is developed.
Another issue is to what extent the withdrawal of benefits from one suborder
can be used as a threat or sanction to abide by the rules of the other suborder.
In a game-theoretic approach threatening with the withdrawal of benefits from
one rule system may be an effective inducement to join (and to respect) an-
other rule system. However, this approach makes one suborder contingent on
another order. If one institutional system falls, the other falls too. This raises the
risk that the overall rule system is endangered. Therefore, the advantage of
threatening with the withdrawal of benefits of one suborder must be weighed
against the risk of destroying the overall rule system.
Thus, the question to what extent the withdrawal of benefits of one suborder
can be used to establish or stabilize another is open. A possible approach to
this question is to explicitly distinguish between two different stages, namely the
creation of an institutional arrangement and the implementation of the rule
system associated with it. In establishing a new institutional framework, with-
holding benefits to non-members from another subsystem is a strong sanction-30-
that is positive for establishing the new order. Once an institutional arrangement
is established, however, the validity of one suborder should — as a principle —
not be contingent on the functioning of some other suborder in order to prevent
institutional domino effects. This means that the instrumental levels should be
clearly separated.
1
5 As a rule, economic policy instruments available to an
international institution should be limited to specific suborders. Trade policy in-
struments should not be employed for environmental policy purposes; the in-
strumental level should thus be modularily subdivided and demarcated.
Drawing a line for which areas no rules should be developed. We have dis-
cussed several areas into which the WTO has to be expanded: services, in-
vestment, property rights, the use of the environment. Other areas are debated
such as competition policy, labor and social standards. Quite clearly, the rule
system has to respond to new issues. But somewhere must be a line where the
WTO is not and should not be in charge. A more theoretical answer is that the
WTO should be concerned about rules for the international division of labor,
including trade of goods and services and international factor mobility and
global public good environment. A basic principle is that differences in endow-
ment are accepted as the starting point for the international division of labor
arbitraged by trade and factor flows. This would exclude protectionism, har-
monization and world wide redistribution. A more practical answer is to look at
which areas nation states are ready to accept to be partly ruled by the WTO
and which new areas of rules the WTO can be absorbed into its rule system
without losing efficacy. This practical aspect may require some caution.
Banning distributional aspects from the world trading order. A rule system
should allow countries to gain from the international division of labor, but it
possibly cannot solve the issue of distribution of benefits between nation states.
1
5 This raises the question of credibility. If the sanction of withdrawing the benefits
from one subsystem is not the best policy response in the implementation phase,
the threat of such a sanction in the phase of establishing the order may lose credi-
bility.-31 -
From trade, all countries can gain. Introducing distributional constraints will
make the world order ineffective. Such issues including the alleviation of
property have to be solved in other ways.
1
6
Multilateralizing regional integrations. An exemption from the single undertaking
nature of WTO is the waiver for regional integrations. Much has been written on
the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism, especially on the
question whether regionalism is the correct road that eventually leads to a
strong multilateral order (Bhagwati 1992). In the last 50 years, regionalism by
and large has not been a hindrance to a multilateral trade order. But this is no
guarantee for the future. Regionalism can always become inward looking; as a
"hub and spoke" agreement (Blackhurst 1997: 531) it can be part of an aggres-
sive bilateralism.
Extending regional integrations with preference zones opens up regional inte-
grations, but it may also strengthen a hub and spoke system where the hubs
are the centers of a bilateral world. Thus, preference zones are not a sufficient
guarantee of multilateralization. An important precondition for multilateralizing
regional integrations is to keep regional integrations open for new members. A
strong mechanism for this is for members of integrated regions to grant con-
cessions to third countries, in the sense of conditional most-favored-nation
treatment where conditional means that the third countries have to grant similar
concessions in order to benefit from the trade barriers' reductions achieved
within the integrated region (Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994: 118). This could be done
on a voluntary basis, but the WTO could also agree on a time table for multi-
lateralization (Srinivasan 1998). All this is not sufficient. A mechanism must be
found by which the barriers erected by regional subsystems of the world are re-
duced in the course of time; there is no automatic mechanism serving that ob-
1
6 This also points out the difficulty which arises when it is attempted to combine the
world trading order and an international environmental order for global media. The
allocation of property rights for using global environmental media is a distributional
issue par excellence.-32-
jective. In the past, the liberalization rounds have fulfilled that task. Possibly,
specific criteria should be established for the waiver to be accepted such as
applying the Kemp-Wan criteria
1
7 (Krueger 1998: 23) or allowing only customs
unions with the lowest tariff level of members as the common tariff (Bhagwati
1991: 71). Another approach is to link regional integrations by agreements
going further than the WTO-system (see below).
Extending to New Members. Enlarging the membership of the WTO-club will
generate additional benefits to the old members. The new members will have
benefits as well. Enlargement of the membership is therefore an important
mechanism to make the system more attractive.
In the long run, the optimal size of WTO is the world as a whole because then
all potential benefits of the international division of labor are exploited. In the
short run, however, there is one important condition for the extension of
membership. The rule system should not be weakened but strengthened when
a new member enters. The pending assessions of China and the Russian
Federation illustrate that a new member can have a strong impact on the WTO-
rule system. New members must accept the rule system as a single under-
taking; they must have a track record showing that they have followed the basic
WTO philosophy for some time. Moreover, economic conditions in the potential
new member countries must be such that the countries are fit to survive in the
world market.
Extending the frontier by a WTO-Plus. Another positive mechanism is to allow
new problems to be solved by a subset of WTO members. These countries
could commit themselves to realize attempted results of the WTO Rounds
,,more quickly than planned, liberalize more than agreed and employ the per-
mitted exceptions less often" (Sachverstandigenrat 1994: 242). Such a WTO-
1
7 This requires trade volume with third countries to be higher after than before the
customer union.-33-
Plus, a world integration a deux vitesses, could advance the integration process
in the world economy. This also holds for dovetailing various regional blocs by
establishing a free trade zone between the blocs, for instance in a trans-Atlantic
economic area (Siebert et al. 1996).-34-
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